Quality of Democracy Makes a Difference, but Not for Everyone: How Political Interest, Education, and Conceptions of Democracy Condition the Relationship Between Democratic Quality and Political Trust by Mauk, Marlene
www.ssoar.info
Quality of Democracy Makes a Difference, but Not
for Everyone: How Political Interest, Education,
and Conceptions of Democracy Condition the
Relationship Between Democratic Quality and
Political Trust
Mauk, Marlene
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Mauk, M. (2021). Quality of Democracy Makes a Difference, but Not for Everyone: How Political Interest, Education,
and Conceptions of Democracy Condition the Relationship Between Democratic Quality and Political Trust. Frontiers in
Political Science, 3, 1-14. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.637344
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-73033-3
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Quality and Political Trust
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Department of Knowledge Exchange and Outreach GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne, Germany
In light of recent crises, not least the COVID-19 pandemic, citizen trust in the political
system has been highlighted as one of the central features ensuring citizen compliance and
the functioning of democracy. Given its many desirable consequences, one of the key
questions is how to increase political trust among ordinary citizens. This paper investigates
the role of democratic quality in determining citizens’ trust in the political system. While we
know that citizens’ evaluations of democratic performance are a strong predictor of
political trust, previous research has shown that trust is not always higher in political
systems with higher democratic quality, indicating that democratic performance
evaluations do not always correspond to actual democratic quality. Several moderating
factors may account for this disconnect between democratic quality and citizens’
evaluations of democratic performance and, ultimately, political trust. For one, citizens
may receive different information about the political system; second, they may process this
information in different ways; and third, they may have different standards of what
democratic quality ought to be. Using survey data from three rounds of the World
Values Survey (2005–2020) and aggregate data on democratic quality and other
macro determinants of political trust from the V-Dem project and World Development
Indicators for 50 democracies around the world, this contribution empirically investigates
the complex relationship between democratic quality, democratic performance
evaluations, and political trust in multi-level moderated mediation models. Its findings
demonstrate that democratic quality affects political trust indirectly through citizens’
democratic performance evaluations and that this indirect effect is stronger for citizens
with higher political interest, higher education, and especially those with more liberal
conceptions of democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the seminal works of David Easton (1965, 1975),
scholars have considered political trust as essential not only
for the stability but also for the smooth functioning of
democracy (Hetherington, 1998; Dalton, 2004; Letki, 2006;
Newton, 2009; Marien and Hooghe, 2011). Especially in times
of crisis, political trust serves an important function for societal
cohesion and compliance. For instance, recent research on the
COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that citizens with higher
political trust are more likely to follow recommendations on
social distancing (Bargain and Aminjonov, 2020; Olsen and
Hjorth, 2020) and to engage in recommended health behavior
(Han et al., 2020). If we want to ensure the stability and smooth
functioning of democracy in times of crisis, then, it is of
paramount importance to secure the trust of ordinary citizens.
Since political trust will always fluctuate in reaction to short-term
stimulants like changes in government (Anderson and
LoTempio, 2002), the implementation of specific policies (Bol
et al., 2020), or economic downturns (Armingeon and
Guthmann, 2014), building or maintaining a reservoir of trust
based on more long-term factors would help retain citizen
cooperation and compliance in times of crisis. One potential
avenue to build such a reservoir of trust could be a strengthening
of democratic quality: as political trust reflects citizens’ attitudes
toward their political system, we might expect it to be at least
somewhat dependent on one of the core characteristics of this
political system, the level of democracy. Yet while there is strong
evidence that citizens’ democratic performance evaluations are
indeed a key predictor of political trust, the relationship between a
country’s democratic quality and how much trust citizens have in
its core political institutions remains obscured. Whereas some
studies find political trust to be higher in countries with higher
democratic quality (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Norris, 2011; van der
Meer and Dekker, 2011), others find this relationship to hold only
under certain model specifications (Anderson and Tverdova,
2003; van der Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017).
In an effort to shed light on this relationship, I first follow van
der Meer (2017) and Mauk (2020a) in arguing that democratic
quality as a macro-level phenomenon does not affect political
trust as an individual-level attitude directly but rather that its
effect is mediated through individual-level democratic
performance evaluations. Second, I advance the theoretical
discussion and dig deeper into the relationship between
democratic quality, democratic performance evaluations, and
political trust by introducing three characteristics of citizens
that may moderate this relationship: political interest,
education, and conceptions of democracy.
Combining data from the World Values Survey (Haerpfer
et al., 2020), Varieties-of-Democracy Project (Coppedge et al.,
2020), and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2020)
for 50 democracies worldwide, the empirical analysis uses multi-
level moderated mediation models to investigate how political
interest, education, and conceptions of democracy interact with
democratic quality in determining democratic performance
evaluations and, subsequently, political trust. The results show
that democratic quality indeed affects political trust only
indirectly, mediated through citizens’ democratic performance
evaluations. This indirect effect is moderated by citizens’
characteristics, with democratic quality affecting political trust
more among the more politically interested, the higher educated,
and especially those with more liberal conceptions of democracy.
The findings contribute to our understanding of the complex
relationship between democratic quality and political trust: they
substantiate and add to previous literature hypothesizing the link
between democratic quality and political trust to run through
citizens’ democratic performance evaluations, and further the
discussion by providing a first account of how this indirect effect




Defined as citizens’ confidence that the political system, its
institutions, or actors will “do what is right even in the
absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug, 1990: 358),
political trust is a relational concept which entails an evaluation of
the relationship between the subject of trust (the citizen) and the
object of trust (the political system). Determinants of trust can
therefore relate to either characteristics of the individual citizen
(exogeneous variables), characteristics of the political system
(endogenous variables), or a combination of these two (van
der Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017).
Democratic quality is clearly a characteristic of the political
system, i.e. the object of trust. Such endogenous characteristics
are typically studied from a rational-choice perspective, arguing
that citizens continuously form positive or negative evaluations
about the political system’s performance which then form the
basis for their attitudes about the political system itself (Barry,
1970; Rogowski, 1974; Kornberg and Clarke, 1992). Previous
research has identified citizens’ evaluations of the democratic
process as one of the key determinants of political trust. Most
prominently, the extent to which citizens find the political elites
and institutions to be corrupt has been consistently found to exert
a strong effect on both trust in institutions and satisfaction with
democracy (Seligson, 2002; Huang et al., 2008; Linde, 2012;
Wang, 2016; Maciel and Sousa, 2018). Political freedoms,
procedural fairness, free and fair elections, and accountability
are other aspects of democratic quality that influence citizens’
attitudes toward the political system (Mishler and Rose, 1997;
Huang et al., 2008; Linde, 2012; Norris, 2014; Magalhães, 2016;
Marien and Werner, 2019). We can therefore expect political
trust to be higher when citizens evaluate the system’s democratic
performance more positively.
Democratic performance evaluations are not, however, the
same as democratic quality. Conceptually, democratic quality is
an assessment of a political system’s structure and processes as
compared to a normative benchmark. These assessments are
usually based on expert judgements and most commonly
relate to liberal democratic ideals, i.e. the presence of universal
suffrage, electoral contestation, political participation, separation
of power, rule of law, and civil liberties (Dahl, 1971; Dahl, 1989;
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Morlino, 2004; Morlino, 2011; Geissel et al., 2016). In contrast,
citizens’ democratic performance evaluations are based on each
individual citizen’s conception of democracy, the information
they receive, and how they process this information (Gómez and
Palacios, 2016; Kriesi and Saris, 2016; Quaranta, 2018a).
Consequently, while we find high agreement across different
measures of democratic quality (Steiner, 2016; Bernhagen,
2019; Boese, 2019), citizens’ evaluations of the same political
system can differ vastly (Pietsch, 2014). Empirically, prior
research has demonstrated that citizens’ evaluations of a
political system’s democratic performance hardly align with
expert judgements of democratic quality (Park, 2013; Bedock
and Panel, 2017; Kruse et al., 2019).
When it comes to political attitudes, unlike individual-level
democratic performance evaluations, macro-level democratic
quality seems to exert only a limited effect. On the one hand,
previous studies find corruption to decrease both trust in political
institutions and satisfaction with democracy (Mishler and Rose,
2001; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; van der Meer and Dekker,
2011; Stockemer and Sundström, 2013; van der Meer and
Hakhverdian, 2017) and citizens’ attitudes tend to be more
positive in political systems with higher electoral quality or
rule of law (Norris, 2011; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014;
Fortin-Rittberger et al., 2017). On the other hand, these effects
mostly disappear completely once citizens’ perceptions of
corruption or other evaluations of democratic performance are
controlled for (Listhaug et al., 2009; Stockemer and Sundström,
2013; Christmann, 2018). We may therefore expect macro-level
democratic quality not to exert a direct effect on political trust but
rather an indirect effect that is mediated through individual-level
democratic performance evaluations (see also Figure 1). Results
presented by van der Meer (2017) and Mauk (2020a) support the
idea of an indirect effect of democratic quality on political trust.
H1: Democratic quality has an indirect effect on political trust
that is mediated through democratic performance evaluations.
While the second part of this indirect effect, i.e. the link
between democratic performance evaluations and political
trust, has received considerable scholarly attention and shall
not be discussed here further, the first part, i.e. the link
between democratic quality and democratic performance
evaluations, remains undertheorized and understudied. If we
want to explain how macro-level democratic quality translates
into individual-level democratic performance evaluations, we may
turn to attitude-formation theories developed primarily in the
field of (social) psychology. Most of these theories identify four
fundamental steps of the attitude-formation process:
environment, information, beliefs, and attitudes (Ajzen and
Fishbein, 1980; Anderson, 1981; Zaller, 1992; Fishbein and
Ajzen, 2010). Building on these theories, we can describe the
process by which democratic quality (environment) translates
into democratic performance evaluations (attitudes) as follows:
Citizens receive information about their political system’s
democratic quality which they interpret through various
cognitive processes to arrive at beliefs about democratic
quality. Comparing and integrating these beliefs with existing
evaluative standards, citizens finally form their democratic
performance evaluations.
As the huge variance of democratic performance evaluations
even within the same country (Bedock and Panel, 2017; Gómez
and Palacios, 2016; Pietsch, 2014) suggests, this process can be
distorted in several ways. As a result, the link between democratic
quality and democratic performance evaluations is likely to be far
from uniform across citizens (see also Figure 1). By extension,
this also means that the entire indirect effect of democratic quality
on political trust may vary from citizen to citizen1. For one, the
information citizens receive about the democratic quality of their
political system can vary greatly, both in quantity and in accuracy.
In general, information about democratic quality can be conveyed
through two main channels: direct experience or indirect
communications through the mass media and other channels
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Wyer and Albarracín, 2005). Direct
experience with democratic quality may, for example, include
witnessing voter intimidation on election day or being the victim
of police harassment; indirect communications on democratic
quality may, for example, include news coverage on a corruption
scandal or social-media posts about gerrymandering. While
direct experiences typically provide accurate, albeit potentially
FIGURE 1 | The theoretical linkage between democratic quality, democratic performance evaluations, and political trust.
1The second part of this indirect effect, i.e. the link between democratic
performance evaluations and political trust, may also vary from citizen to
citizen as some citizens may place greater weight on democratic performance
evaluations than others when forming their attitudes about the political system as a
whole (see, e.g., van der Meer, 2017). While such variations would also mean that
the entire indirect effect of democratic quality on political trust varies between
citizens, this contribution is primarily interested in how citizen characteristics
condition the first part of the indirect effect, i.e. the link between macro-level
democratic quality and individual-level democratic performance evaluations.
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localized, information about democratic quality, not only the
advent of “fake news” has cast doubt on the accuracy of indirect
communications. Especially in non-democratic contexts, media
freedom can be severely limited, and citizens have few means of
obtaining accurate information about their country’s democratic
quality through indirect communications (Egorov et al., 2009;
Popescu, 2011; Stier, 2015). In democracies, in contrast, the
presence of media freedom and a pluralist media landscape
means that accurate information about democratic quality is
available from the media and other indirect channels, and the
availability of information should hardly vary from citizen to
citizen. What does vary, however, is the amount of information
citizens receive. For both direct experience and indirect
communications, those with higher political interest are more
likely to receive information about the political system’s
democratic quality as they are more likely to participate in
politics and to follow political content on news and other
media (Verba et al., 1997; Strömböck et al., 2013; Lecheler and
Vreese, 2017; Owens and Walker, 2018). As the more politically
interested know more about the state of democracy in their
country, i.e. hold more accurate beliefs, their democratic
performance evaluations should more closely reflect the actual
democratic quality of the political system. Consequently, we can
expect the effect of democratic quality on democratic
performance evaluations and, ultimately, the entire indirect
effect democratic quality has on political trust to be larger for
citizens with higher political interest.
H2: The indirect effect of democratic quality on political trust
increases with political interest.
Second, the cognitive processes through which citizens
interpret this information may also vary from individual to
individual. Accurately processing complex information from
different sources requires considerable cognitive skills, for
instance to judge the credibility of the source, to weigh
information from different sources, and to understand the
content of the information they receive. Apart from cognitive
capacity itself, one major factor determining how citizens
translate information into beliefs is education (van der Meer,
2010; Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). Ceteris paribus, we can
expect those with higher education to be more likely to be able
both to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources of
information and to understand their content correctly.
Consequently, the higher educated not only have higher
political knowledge but also hold more accurate beliefs about
the political system (Seligson, 2002; Monsiváis-Carrillo and
Cantú Ramos, 2020). Lending empirical support to the idea
that the well-educated are better informed about their
country’s democratic quality, Ananda and Bol (2020) show
that providing information about democracy to citizens in
Indonesia lowers satisfaction with democracy among the lower
educated but not among the higher educated. If we assume that
education increases the accuracy of citizens’ beliefs about their
country’s democratic quality, we can expect education to have a
moderating effect on the relationship between macro-level
democratic quality and individual-level democratic
performance evaluations as well as, by extension, political trust.
Prior research strongly supports this proposition, at least when
it comes to the effect of corruption. In their study of 21 European
democracies, Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) demonstrate that
corruption only has an effect on political trust for citizens with at
least medium levels of education, while political trust among
those with the lowest levels of education remains virtually
unaffected by the amount of corruption in the respective
country. This finding is corroborated by van der Meer and
Hakhverdian (2017). Additionally, van der Meer (2010)
presents evidence of an interaction effect between corruption
and education in 26 European democracies, finding corruption to
always have a negative effect on trust in parliament but for trust to
decrease more rapidly for citizens with higher education. More
generally, Monsiváis-Carrillo and Cantú Ramos’ (2020) results
for 18 Latin American democracies suggest that democratic
quality increases satisfaction with democracy among highly
educated citizens, whereas it has little to no effect among the
less educated. Providing further evidence for an interaction
between democratic quality and education, Ugur-Cinar et al.
(2020) show that education and political trust are positively
correlated in countries with low levels of corruption but that
in highly corrupt countries, the more highly educated express less
trust in political institutions than the less educated. Similarly,
Agerberg (2019) finds education to have a weaker positive effect
on what he calls “institutional attitudes” in democracies with high
levels of corruption, indicating that corruption has a stronger
negative effect on citizens’ attitudes among the higher educated.
Overall, we can therefore expect the indirect effect of democratic
quality on political trust to be larger for more highly educated
citizens.
H3: The indirect effect of democratic quality on political trust
increases with education.
Finally, we can expect the effect of democratic quality on
political trust to vary with the standards to which citizens
compare their beliefs. When it comes to such standards,
previous research has predominantly examined the role of
citizens’ value orientations. Scholars in the critical-citizens
tradition have long argued that increasingly liberal and
democratic value orientations among citizens set expectations
that no real-world political system can ever meet and that this
results in lower levels of political trust among citizens with
stronger pro-democratic values (Dalton, 2000; Dalton, 2004;
Norris, 1999; Norris, 2011). In addition, a number of
researchers have pointed to the role of education, suggesting
that apart from its accuracy-inducing function (see above,
hypothesis 3), education also has a norm-inducing function.
According to this view, higher education elicits stronger
support for core democratic values and principles (Evans and
Rose, 2007; Kotzian, 2011; Kołczyńska, 2020), which then leads to
citizens attaching higher priority to democratic quality when
evaluating their political system (Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012;
van der Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017; Monsiváis-Carrillo and
Cantú Ramos, 2020). Empirically, while previous studies confirm
a moderating effect of education on how democratic quality
relates to political trust (see above), evidence for an interaction
between democratic quality and citizens’ value orientations is
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scarce and at best mixed. While Huhe and Tang (2017) find pro-
democratic value orientations to have a more positive effect on
political trust in democracies than in autocracies in their analysis
of 13 East Asian political systems, Mauk’s (2020b) analysis of 102
political systems across the globe provides no empirical support
for an interaction between macro-level democratic quality and
citizens’ value orientations.
One potential explanation for the mixed results is that citizens’
value orientations condition the relationship between democratic
performance evaluations and political trust (see also Mauk,
2020a; Mauk, 2020b) but not the relationship between
democratic quality and democratic performance evaluations.
Instead, I suggest that citizens employ another standard to
which they compare their beliefs about democratic quality:
conceptions of democracy. This proposition builds on Torcal
and Trechsel (2016), who argue that conceptions of democracy
set expectations and determine which contextual factors citizens
deem most relevant when forming their evaluations of
democratic performance. For beliefs about democratic quality
to be translated into democratic performance evaluations, citizens
must compare them to what they think constitutes high
democratic quality, i.e. their conceptions of democracy. Just as
political interest and education, conceptions of democracy among
citizens can vary widely. Previous research has shown citizens’
conceptions of democracy to range not only from minimalist
electoral conceptions to maximalist substantive conceptions but
also to sometimes include elements that are clearly undemocratic
from a normative perspective (Dalton et al., 2007; Hernández,
2016; Shin and Kim, 2018; Ceka and Magalhães, 2020; Zagrebina,
2020). Depending on their conception of democracy, citizens will
arrive at different evaluations of democratic performance even if
they hold the exact same beliefs about democratic quality (Torcal
and Trechsel, 2016). For instance, Bedock and Panel (2017) find
that French citizens with a more minimalist conception of
democracy (focusing mostly on free and fair elections) tend to
evaluate their political system’s democratic performance more
positively than those who hold a more encompassing conception
of democracy (including elements of direct democracy). Overall,
the more closely citizens’ conceptions of democracy align with the
academic definition of democratic quality, the more closely
macro-level democratic quality should relate to individual-level
democratic performance evaluations. If we follow themainstream
of scholarship and define democratic quality in primarily
procedural and liberal terms (Dahl, 1971; Dahl, 1989; Morlino,
2004; Morlino, 2011; Geissel et al., 2016), this means that
democratic quality should have a larger effect on democratic
performance evaluations and, by extension, political trust for
citizens who hold more procedural and liberal conceptions of
democracy. Concerning such an interaction effect between
democratic quality and citizens’ conceptions of democracy,
previous literature is scarce, yet unanimous. Analyzing 29
political systems in Europe, Hooghe et al. (2017) show that
good governance conditions how citizens’ conceptions of
democracy affect political trust, with procedural conceptions of
democracy having a more positive effect on political trust in
countries with higher levels of good governance. van der Meer
(2017) goes one step further and examines the entire causal chain
from macro-level democratic quality to individual-level political
trust including the mediating effect of citizens’ democratic
performance evaluations. His results for 26 European
democracies evidence that the effects of macro-level
impartiality on trust in parliament are mediated at least in
part through citizens’ evaluations of democratic quality.
Testing for the moderating effect of conceptions of democracy,
he finds that both macro-level impartiality and individual-level
democratic performance evaluations play a larger role in shaping
political trust for citizens who understand democracy in primarily
procedural terms. Investigating the link between what they call
“democratic knowledge” and citizens’ evaluations of democratic
performance, Wegscheider and Stark (2020) demonstrate that
citizens who consider only democratic (instead of autocratic)
principles as essential characteristics of democracy–i.e. hold a
conception of democracy that comes closer to its scholarly
definition–evaluate their own country’s democratic
performance more positively in more democratic countries
and more negatively in more authoritarian countries.
Summing up, we can expect democratic performance
evaluations to reflect macro-level democratic quality more
closely for citizens who hold procedural and liberal
conceptions of democracy, and consequently for the indirect
effect of democratic quality on political trust to be larger for
these citizens.
H4: The indirect effect of democratic quality on political trust is
stronger among citizens who hold a more liberal conception of
democracy.
DATA AND METHODS
To examine how macro-level democratic quality interacts with
individual-level political interest, education, and conceptions of
democracy in determining citizens’ democratic performance
evaluations and ultimately political trust, I combine aggregate
data from the Varieties-of-Democracy project (Coppedge et al.,
2020) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2020)
with survey data from the World Values Survey (Haerpfer et al.,
2020). As the World Values Survey (WVS) has included suitable
questions on democratic performance evaluations, political
interest, education, and conceptions of democracy since its
fifth round fielded from 2005, I can make use of three full
rounds of the WVS (round five, 2005–2008; round 6,
2010–2014; round seven, 2017–2020). These data cover 50
democracies2 in 92 country-years worldwide3 (for a full list of
countries, see Supplementary Table S1).
For the dependent variable political trust, I use three indicators
measuring citizens’ confidence in the government, national
parliament, and courts. Institutional confidence is a commonly
used measure of political trust (Dalton, 2004; Moehler, 2009;
Hooghe et al., 2015). Taken together, the three institutions
2Countries are classified as democratic according to V-Dem’s Regimes-of-the-
World (RoW) measure (Lührmann et al., 2018).
3Not every country is covered in all rounds of the WVS.
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government, parliament, and courts cover all three branches of
government and should thus represent citizens’ attitudes toward
the political system as a whole. In all analyses, political trust will
be modeled latently.
A single-item measurement captures the mediating variable
democratic performance evaluations. By asking respondents how
democratically they think their country is being governed today
on a scale from completely undemocratic to completely
democratic, the World Values Survey prompts a general and
summative evaluation of democratic performance. Such a general
and summative evaluation appears well-suited to my purposes as
it does not provide any particular conception of democracy or
emphasize any specific aspect of democratic quality, leaving
citizens free to employ their own standards.
For the key independent variable, democratic quality, I employ
V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index. This index captures both
electoral (universal suffrage, electoral contestation, political
participation) and liberal (separation of powers, rule of law,
civil liberties) components of democracy and thereby represents
common conceptions of democratic quality (Dahl, 1971; Dahl,
1989; Morlino, 2004; Morlino, 2011; Geissel et al., 2016).
The theoretical argument outlined above proposes three
variables moderating the effect of macro-level democratic
quality on individual-level democratic performance
evaluations: political interest, education, and conceptions of
democracy. A question asking respondents how interested they
are in politics measures political interest. For education, the
World Values Survey records the highest level of education
respondents have completed. The most recent round of the
WVS uses the 9-category ISCED-2011 classification of
education, but earlier rounds use different classifications and
detailed categorizations are not available for all countries. To
establish a minimum level of comparability, I recode the
education variable into three categories: primary education or
less; at least some secondary education; at least some tertiary
education. While this is far from ideal, it allows us to compare the
effects of democratic quality between citizens with low education
(primary or less) and those with high education (at least some
tertiary). For the third moderator, citizens’ conceptions of
democracy, the WVS contains a question battery asking
respondents which of a list of items are essential
characteristics of democracy. Even though the number and
content of items varies slightly from survey round to survey
round, all three rounds contain three items which capture core
elements of a procedural and liberal conception of democracy:
people choose their leaders in free elections; civil rights protect
people from state oppression; women have the same rights as
men. Following Kirsch and Welzel (2019), I use a factor of these
three items to measure liberal conceptions of democracy. All
moderating variables as well as democratic quality are scaled from
0 (lowest possible value) to 1 (highest possible value) to allow for a
straightforward interpretation of the cross-level interaction
effects.
All empirical models control for alternative individual-level
determinants of political trust: social trust (Zmerli and Newton,
2008), financial satisfaction (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005), and
household income (Zmerli and Newton, 2011). They also include
age and gender as standard sociodemographics. On the macro
level, the analyses control for a country’s macroeconomic
performance (logged GDP per capita, annual GDP growth;
van Erkel and van der Meer, 2016) and human development
(level of education, degree of urbanization, life expectancy;
Norris, 2011). Data for country-level education come from
V-Dem, whereas urbanization, life expectancy, and
macroeconomic indicators are based on the World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 2020). All macro-level data are matched to
the survey data with a 1-year lag to ensure that citizens have had a
chance to gather and process the relevant information.
To estimate the (moderated) multi-level mediation effect
proposed in the hypotheses, the empirical analyses use multi-
level structural equation modeling (MSEM). MSEM takes into
account the hierarchical nature of the data and allows for latent
estimation of the dependent variable political trust. MSEM is
superior to traditional approaches to multi-level mediation
analysis as it decomposes the variance of all variables into
within and between variance and thereby avoids producing
conflated estimates of between and within components of the
indirect effect (Meuleman, 2019; Preacher et al., 2010). All models
were estimated using Mplus (version 8.4; Muthén et al., 2019).
Given the hierarchical nature of the data and the unbalanced
TSCS design where some countries were surveyed in only a
single year, while other countries were surveyed in two or even
three years, a three-level model structure (individuals nested in
country-years nested in countries) with year dummies at the
country-year level would be most appropriate. Due to the
relatively low number of level-3 clusters (countries), however,
models using this structure run into estimation problems
(Meuleman and Billiet, 2009). The main models presented
here thus utilize a simpler two-level structure (individuals
nested in country-years, with year dummies on the country-
year level). Robustness checks show that the three-level structure
yields substantially similar results, even though standard errors
may not be trustworthy for these models (cf. Supplementary
Table S3, Supplementary Figure S2). Additional robustness
checks using only the newest available data for each country
in order to avoid creating an unbalanced TSCS structure also
yield substantially the same results as the main models (cf.
Supplementary Table S4, Supplementary Figure S3). As we
lack truly longitudinal data4, the models follow common practice
and leverage between-country-year differences in democratic
quality to estimate how democratic quality affects democratic
performance evaluations and political trust. Model-building
proceeds stepwise, starting with the direct effect of individual-
level democratic performance evaluations on political trust
(Model 1) before adding the direct effect of macro-level
democratic quality (Model 2) and the indirect effect of
democratic quality via democratic performance evaluations
4Most importantly, the World Values Survey is not a panel study and we therefore
cannot compare characteristics on the individual level over time. Additionally, not
every country is covered in every round of the World Values Survey, which results
in an unbalanced TSCS design and severely limits the amount of time-series data
we could use even for a purely aggregate analysis.
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(Model 3). The final set of models includes cross-level
interactions to examine the moderating effects of political
interest, education, and conceptions of democracy on
democratic performance evaluations and, by extension, on
political trust (Models 4–6). By estimating the cross-level
interaction between macro-level democratic quality and
individual-level political interest, education, and conceptions
of democracy, thanks to the symmetrical nature of the
interaction term (cf. Bauer and Curran, 2005), these models
can test not only whether these individual-level characteristics
(political interest, education, conception of democracy) have a
larger effect in more democratic countries but also whether
democratic quality has a larger effect among the more
politically interested, the more educated, and those with a
more liberal conception of democracy. By combining multi-
level mediation with cross-level interaction effects, these
models allow us to test complex hypotheses about the origins
of political trust and to study how democratic quality affects
democratic performance evaluations and, eventually, political
trust, differently among different people.
RESULTS
Based on the empirical analysis of 50 democracies (in 92 country-
years) across the globe, Model 1 in Table 1 corroborates the bulk of
previous research by confirming that individual-level democratic
performance evaluations have a strong positive effect on political
trust. In contrast, we observe no direct effect of macro-level
democratic quality on political trust (Model 2, Table 1). Instead,
confirming hypothesis 1, macro-level democratic quality exerts a
sizable indirect effect on political trust that is mediated through
individual-level democratic performance evaluations (Model 3,
Table 1). Figure 2 depicts this indirect effect graphically. It
illustrates that while democratic quality does not directly affect
how much trust citizens have in their core political institutions
(path c’), it strongly influences how democratic they find their
country to be (path a), and these democratic performance
evaluations in turn shape citizens’ political trust (path b).
Turning to the core research question, Models 4 to 6 (Table 2)
investigate the cross-level interactions between democratic
quality and political interest (Model 4), education (Model 5),
and conceptions of democracy (Model 6). In line with the
theoretical argument, which expects the relationship between
macro-level democratic quality and democratic performance
evaluations to vary according to citizens’ information (political
interest), cognitive processes (education), and standards
(conceptions of democracy), Models 4 to 6 estimate these
cross-level interactions on the first part of the indirect effect
(path a), i.e. the link between democratic quality and democratic
performance evaluations. Slopes for the second part of the
indirect effect (path b), i.e. the link between democratic
TABLE 1 | Democratic quality, democratic performance evaluations, and political trust.
Model 1 individual-
level effects
Model 2 direct effect
of democratic quality
Model 3 indirect effect
of democratic quality
Within direct effects
Democratic performance evaluations 0.22c (0.01) 0.22c (0.01) 0.22c (0.01)
Political interest 0.10c (0.01) 0.10c (0.01) 0.10c (0.01)
Education (ref: primary or less)
Secondary -0.03c (0.01) -0.03c (0.01) -0.03c (0.01)
Tertiary -0.03c (0.01) -0.03c (0.01) -0.03c (0.01)
Liberal conception of democracy -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Between direct effect
Democratic quality -0.05 (0.08) -0.11 (0.07)
Between indirect effect
Democratic quality via democratic performance evaluations 0.16c (0.05)
Democratic quality on democratic performance evaluations 0.23c (0.06)
Democratic performance evaluations on political trust 0.70c (0.09)
Individual-level control variables YES YES YES
System-level control variables NO YES YES
Year dummies NO YES YES
Individuals 117,120 117,120 117,120
Country-years 92 92 92
r2 (within) 0.14 0.14 0.13
r2 (between) - 0.56 0.73
AIC 173,725 176,259 158,551
Notes: Multi-level structural equationmodeling. Maximum likelihood estimation. Random-intercept models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Individual-level control variables: social





Sources: World Values Survey 2005–2020; V-Dem v10; World Development Indicators.
Frontiers in Political Science | www.frontiersin.org May 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 6373447
Mauk Democratic Quality and Political Trust
TABLE 2 | The conditional effects of democratic quality on political trust.
Model 4 conditioning effect of political
interest
Model 5 conditioning effect of
education
Model 6 conditioning effect of conception of
democracy
Between indirect effect on political trust (via democratic performance evaluations)
Democratic quality 0.14b (0.06) 0.11a (0.05) -0.05 (0.03)
Within indirect effects on political trust (via democratic performance evaluations)
Political interest 0.01 (0.01)
Education: secondary -0.03a (0.01)
Education: tertiary -0.08c (0.02)
Liberal conception of democracy -0.04 (0.03)
Cross-level interaction effects
Democratic quality x political interest 0.05a (0.02)
Democratic quality x education: secondary 0.03 (0.02)
Democratic quality x education: tertiary 0.13c (0.03)
Democratic quality x liberal conception of democracy 0.18b (0.06)
Individual-level control variables YES YES YES
System-level control variables YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES
Individuals 117,120 117,120 117,120
Country-years 92 92 92
AIC 157,866 158,019 156,061
Notes: Multi-level structural equation modeling. Maximum likelihood estimation. Random-slope models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Individual-level control variables: social trust, financial satisfaction, household income, gender,



































performance evaluations and political trust, are fixed. All
variations in the overall indirect effect of democratic quality
on political trust shown in Table 2 and Figure 3 will therefore
solely reflect the conditionality of the relationship between
democratic quality and democratic performance evaluations
(path a of the indirect effect). The cross-level interaction
effects are introduced into the models separately and one at a
time. This means that for each model, the coefficient of
democratic quality can be interpreted as the indirect effect
democratic quality has on political trust for citizens who score
“0” on the respective moderating variable. As all moderating
variables were scaled from 0 to 1, this equals the effect of
democratic quality for citizens with no political interest at all
(Model 4), the lowest possible level of education (Model 5), or the
most illiberal conception of democracy (Model 6). The coefficient
for the interaction term then represents the difference in effect
size for democratic quality between these citizens and those who
score “1” on the respective moderating variable, i.e. those with
high political interest (Model 4), secondary or tertiary5 education
(Model 5), or the most liberal conception of democracy (Model
6). To provide some graphical representation of these numbers,
Figure 3 illustrates the interactions by plotting the average
marginal effects of democratic quality at different levels of the
moderating variables.
Beginning with the moderating effect of political interest, Model 4
shows a significant, yet weak cross-level interaction between
democratic quality and political interest, indicating that the indirect
effect of democratic quality on political trust is at least to some extent
contingent on how politically interested each individual citizen is. For
those with higher political interest, democratic quality plays a larger
role than for those with lower political interest. While democratic
quality has a positive effect on democratic performance evaluations
even for the politically uninterested, this effect is about 30% stronger
for those with high political interest. Even though the difference
between individual citizens is comparativelyminor (see also Figure 3),
we can still interpret this as tentative evidence for hypothesis 2 and the
idea that citizens who receive more information about democratic
quality generally hold more accurate beliefs about their country’s
democratic quality than those who receive less information.6
Model 5 presents empirical evidence on the moderating effect
of education (hypothesis 3). Since education is a categorical
variable, we need to estimate cross-level interactions between
democratic quality and a dummy variable for each level of
education, except the reference category (primary or less). The
coefficient for the interaction term then indicates the difference in
FIGURE 3 | Conditional indirect effects of democratic quality on political trust. Notes: Multilevel structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood estimation.
Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying levels of political interest/education/conceptions of democracy. Model
specifications according to Models 4–6 in Table 2. Sources: World Values Survey 2005-2020; V-Dem v10; World Development Indicators.
FIGURE 2 | The indirect effect of democratic quality on political trust. Notes: Multilevel structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood estimation.
Unstandardized estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Model specifications according to Model 3 in Table 1. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Sources:
World Values Survey 2005-2020; V-Dem v10; World Development Indicators.
5Since education is a categorical variable, Model 5 includes cross-level interactions
with dummy variables for secondary and tertiary education, respectively (reference
category: primary education or less).
6For the sake of brevity, Table 2 reports only the cross-level interactions on the
total indirect effect of democratic quality on political trust. Supplementary Table
S2 and Supplementary Figure S1 demonstrate that the moderating effects of
political interest, education, and conceptions of democracy are even stronger when
looking only at the theoretically relevant part of this indirect effect, i.e. the link
between democratic quality and democratic performance evaluations (path a).
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the effect of democratic quality for respondents with the respective level
of education (secondary, tertiary) compared to respondents in the
reference category, i.e. those with primary education or less. Looking at
the results, we find no cross-level interaction between secondary
education and democratic quality, indicating that democratic quality
does not have a stronger indirect effect on political trust for citizens
with secondary education compared to citizens with primary or less
education (see also Figure 3). This changes for tertiary education: here,
the interaction term is significant and positive, indicating that
democratic quality plays a larger role for political trust among
citizens with tertiary education compared to citizens who have at
most primary education, with the effect size more than doubling for
citizens with tertiary education. Interpreting these findings within the
theoretical framework outlined above, tertiary education appears to
make citizens more capable of adequately processing the information
they receive about democratic quality, leading to these citizens having
considerably more accurate beliefs about their country’s democratic
quality than their lesser educated counterparts.
Finally, Model 6 demonstrates that conceptions of democracy
exert a strong moderating effect on how democratic quality affects
political trust. As evidenced by both the large coefficient for the
cross-level interaction (Table 2) as well as the plot in Figure 3, the
indirect effect of democratic quality on political trust varies
dramatically between citizens with different conceptions of
democracy. For those who hold a predominantly illiberal
conception of democracy, higher democratic quality actually
relates to lower political trust, indicating that these citizens
apply standards that are very different from the mainstream
academic definition when translating their beliefs about
democratic quality into evaluations of democratic performance.
This negative indirect effect of democratic quality vanishes and
turns into a significant positive effect when citizens’ conceptions of
democracy become more liberal. For those with the most liberal
conceptions of democracy–aligningmost closely with the academic
definition of democratic quality–, democratic quality exerts a
strong positive indirect effect on political trust, about four times
the size of the (negative) effect it had for those with highly illiberal
conceptions of democracy (hypothesis 4).
Summing up, the empirical evidence clearly corroborates the idea
that macro-level democratic quality affects political trust only
indirectly, i.e. via individual-level democratic performance
evaluations. With regard to the conditionality of this indirect effect
of democratic quality, the results provide at least some evidence for a
moderating effect of political interest, education, and conceptions of
democracy. While results were mixed for education–only tertiary
education made a difference for how democratic quality affects
political trust–and rather weak for political interest, the analysis
found strong support for a moderating effect of conceptions of
democracy, showing substantial differences between citizens with
more liberal conceptions of democracy and those with more
illiberal conceptions of democracy.
DISCUSSION
When it comes to the relationship between democratic quality
and political trust, previous research has yielded mixed results.
This contribution set out to enhance our understanding of this
intricate relationship and to investigate whether and how macro-
level democratic quality affects individual-level political trust.
Integrating research on political trust with social psychological
theories of attitude formation, it developed a theoretical
framework which explicates the mechanisms that link macro-
level context factors like democratic quality with individual-level
attitudes like political trust and suggested a number of ways in
which citizen characteristics may interact with macro-level
democratic quality in shaping political trust. Utilizing multi-
level structural equation models that combined mediation with
moderating effects, it was able to test these complex relationships
between democratic quality, democratic performance
evaluations, political interest, education, conceptions of
democracy, and political trust. Based on a broad data base
covering 50 democracies on all continents, its findings are
two-fold. First, democratic quality does affect political trust,
but only indirectly by shaping citizens’ democratic
performance evaluations, which in turn are a core predictor of
political trust. Second, this effect of democratic quality on
democratic performance evaluations and, consequently, its
indirect effect on political trust, is not uniform for all citizens.
Instead, democratic performance evaluations correspond more
closely with expert-assessed democratic quality among those with
more political interest, higher education, and especially those who
hold more liberal conceptions of democracy.
These results lend support not only to the basic proposition
that democratic quality exerts a purely indirect effect on political
trust but also to the underlying idea that citizens need to receive,
process, and interpret information about their country’s
democratic quality to arrive at democratic performance
evaluations. As a first account of the interactions between
democratic quality, political interest, education, and
conceptions of democracy, they can serve as a vantage point
for further theory-building and empirical analyses. For instance,
future studies could gain more insight into these mechanisms by
collecting data on citizens’ beliefs about democratic quality that
allow for a direct test of the underlying assumptions. They could
test whether those who are more politically interested actually
receive more information about their country’s democratic
quality and whether those with higher education are more able
to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources of
information as well as to correctly process this information,
resulting in more accurate beliefs about democratic quality.
Another emerging question is whether conceptions of
democracy really serve as standards against which citizens
compare their beliefs about democratic quality to translate
these into democratic performance evaluations. Building on
the present insights, researchers may further be interested in
investigating the sources of citizens’ information and how the
media landscape and citizens’ use of different media channels
condition which information citizens receive, for instance
whether citizens trust certain sources of information more
than others and whether these sources of information differ
systematically in the content and type of information they
provide. The question of what sources of information citizens
rely on becomes evenmore pressing when taking into account not
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only democracies but also autocracies, which guarantee not even
a minimum of media freedom and where alternative sources of
information may be hard to access. Moreover, given the
limitations of the (survey) data, the present study could only
leverage between-country differences in democratic quality to
examine the relationship between democratic quality, democratic
performance evaluations, and political trust. Using time-series
data and/or conducting case studies, future research may also
want to investigate within-country effects and study whether and
how citizens react to changes in democratic quality.
Despite their limitations, the present findings can provide
some implications for how to secure citizens’ trust in the
political system. First and foremost, they demonstrate that
strengthening democracy is beneficial not only for normative
reasons but can also help maintaining and winning political
trust among ordinary citizens. Above all in times of crisis,
political trust that is rooted in citizens’ appreciation of a
political system’s democratic quality can serve as a reservoir
of goodwill and contribute to ensuring social cohesion and
citizen compliance with government measures. Governments
might therefore wish to engage in programs aimed at
improving democratic quality, for example the UNDP’s
Global Program for Strengthening the Rule of Law and
Human Rights (United Nations Development Programme,
2020). In addition, the positive effects of such programs
could be amplified through public information campaigns
and other measures aimed at reaching broad segments of
the population and in particular those who may otherwise
not actively seek out information about the political system as
well as those who may normally experience difficulties in
understanding and processing such information (Weiss and
Tschirhart, 1994; Solovei and van den Putte, 2020). Finally, the
findings suggest that democratic decisionmakers would be
well-advised to make sure their country’s citizens have a
liberal conception of democracy. Based on previous studies
on sources of conceptions of democracy, this goal may also be
served well by public information campaigns, as long as they
include information on what democratic quality means (Cho,
2015; Quaranta, 2018b; Hernández, 2019). Especially in new
and emerging democracies, conceptions of democracy might
play a crucial role in how citizens evaluate and reward what are
often incremental improvements in the quality of political
institutions. At the same time, the results presented in this
study tie in with the ongoing debate on democratic backsliding
(Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Waldner and Lust, 2018;
Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Bakke and Sitter, 2020). In
substantiating and qualifying the relationship between
democratic quality and political trust, they exemplify that
the curtailing of core democratic principles we are currently
witnessing in countries like Poland and Hungary are likely to
be met with backlash from citizens–but primarily among the
politically interested, higher educated, and especially those
holding more liberal conceptions of democracy.
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